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COGNITIVE ECONOMY AND THE TRESPASS FALLACY: A 
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR MOSSOFF 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat∗ 
In his recent essay The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, Professor 
Adam Mossoff argues cogently that the metaphor of trespass has 
become a misused basis for patent indeterminacy critiques that it cannot 
conceptually or empirically support.1 While sharing his caution that 
metaphors are not to be trifled with, this reply suggests that trespass has 
both a smaller role and a larger potential benefit in the debate on patent 
indeterminacy, and advances an opposite solution. 
Patent protection must continually resolve not one, but two subjects 
of indeterminacy: notice and teaching. Professor Mossoff’s essay 
addresses critiques about the notice function of patents, which is to 
inform the public about the boundaries of a patent’s rights to exclude 
others from practicing the disclosed invention.2 Related to notice is the 
teaching function of patents, which is to educate the public about what 
the invention is and how to practice it.3 Put another way, claims that 
deliver proper notice of boundaries are precise proxies for the invention, 
and claims that deliver proper teaching are accurate proxies.4 
For its part, the teaching function draws analytical and rhetorical 
force from a different metaphor: that of a contract between inventor and 
society in which the bargained-for exchange is that an inventor conveys 
adequate disclosure about an invention and society conveys in return a 
limited right to exclude others from practicing it.5 This bargain guards 
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 1. Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687 (2013). 
 2. See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(observing that giving such notice is the “principal function” of patent claims). 
 3. See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (distinguishing descriptive notice about the nature of the invention from prescriptive 
notice about what the patent confers a right to exclude others from doing). 
 4. See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1, 42 (2012) (“In short, the disclosure requirements of § 112 ¶ 1 ensure that the claims 
are accurate proxies for the invention while the indefiniteness requirement housed in § 112 ¶ 2 
ensures that they are precise proxies.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (describing the patent 
system as “a carefully crafted bargain”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 
(describing disclosure as “the quid pro quo of the right to exclude”). The Supreme Court has 
further noted that the metaphor of bargained-for exchange is particular to patents. See Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (stating that “our references to a quid pro quo typically appear in 
the patent context.”). 
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against the undersupply of knowledge that would otherwise result from 
the high fixed cost of creating knowledge and the low marginal cost of 
copying it.6 Indeed, the language of contract further informs whether 
notice of patent boundaries is enough to satisfy the public’s “reliance” 
interest on sources of boundary notice such as the prosecution history of 
a patent’s examination.7 Critiques of patent indeterminacy adopt the 
trespass metaphor only as to the violation of the patent right8 and only 
to describe the violation, not to evaluate it. As to the creation of patent 
rights, the justification for their scope, and the normative effects of their 
violation, it is the contract metaphor—a patentee asserting exclusionary 
power out of proportion to the contribution that the patent offers in 
exchange—that predominates. 
This cabined use of trespass is a clue to its value. The language of 
trespass appears and appeals in patent law, and other legal domains such 
as cyberspace law,9 because it offers for doctrinal debates a cognitive 
economy based on what preeminent metaphor theorist George Lakoff 
described as a cognitive conceptual system shared among all humans.10 
Thus, to seek conceptual symmetry between patents and real property, 
as Professor Mossoff suggests, is appropriate, but doing so by 
abstracting arguments up to the generality of patent estate boundaries 
discards the very cognitive economy that makes trespass a conceptually 
useful metaphor at all. To be sure, it is an empirical question whether 
and to what extent trespass is a truly communal cognitive metaphor 
akin, e.g., to Lakoff’s example of argument as war.11 Yet on this point, 
Professor Mossoff’s normative argument that the trespass fallacy 
obscures patent policy on a large scale suggests at least his descriptive 
agreement that the metaphor of trespass is widely enough accepted to do 
such damage. 
6. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 994–95 (1997). 
7. See Biogen Idec, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 713 F.3d 1090, 1095 (2013) (noting
that prosecution history “promotes the public notice function of the intrinsic evidence and 
protects the public’s reliance on definitive statements made during prosecution”). 
8. Professor Mossoff himself notes this limitation. Mossoff, supra note 1, at 1697
(framing trespass as merely “a single doctrine that provides redress for a particular way the legal 
right [of real property] is violated”). 
9. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace As Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 445 (2003). 
10. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO
POETIC METAPHOR 50 (1989), cited in Hunter, supra note 9, at 469–71. Hunter explains a 
Lakoffian mapping between a target domain describing the principal subject of a metaphor and a 
source domain from which the metaphor draws salient features and attributes them to the target. 
Hunter, supra note 9, at 467–68. 
11. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 4 (1980).
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The better solution, then, is to ask what subsidiary doctrine of patent 
law is commensurate in analytical scope with the doctrine of trespass in 
real property. A reasonable answer to this question may be, direct 
infringement of the right to exclude another from making the patented 
invention or performing the patented process. Direct infringement is the 
simplest violation of a patent right, and consists only of doing without 
the patent owner’s permission something that the patent owner can 
exclude others from doing.12 Moreover, while the activities excludable 
by a patent are making, using, offering for sale, and selling, it is the 
particular right to make an invention—or, for a process, the right to 
perform it—that is of greatest relevance in the current debate.13 
This scaling-down still presents empirical difficulty in comparing 
uncertainty for the physical boundaries of real estate against trespass 
with uncertainty for the prescriptive boundaries of a patent claim 
against direct making or performing. For example, physical boundaries 
of real estate are possible to determine ex ante by reference to fixed 
principles of surveying, making trespass more a quantifiable risk. By 
contrast, principles of patent claim construction are not as well fixed for 
ex ante resolution, subjecting the determination of claim boundaries 
more to a form of Knightian uncertainty.14 But this difficulty is at least 
partly tractable by the use of proxies for uncertainty in the patent right, 
such as changes in market valuation of the patent owner in response to 
judicial resolutions of legal uncertainty through adjudication.15 
Importantly, the need for adequate public notice persists even at this 
greater level of specificity about a particular patent doctrine (direct 
infringement) as to a particular right (to exclude others from making the 
patented invention or performing the patented process). In this regard, 
the comparison to trespass is particularly illustrative because, whereas 
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Direct infringement is distinguishable from indirect forms of
infringement such as actively inducing others to infringe or contributing to others’ infringement 
through the sale of a component or enabling material or apparatus that is made or adapted for 
use in the infringement and has no substantial noninfringing use. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b)–(c). 
13. The right to offer for sale or sell and the right to use, respectively, implicate liability
for intermediaries in the stream of commerce and liability for end users. These are important 
dimensions of the patent reform debate, e.g., Brian J. Love & James C. Yoon, Expanding Patent 
Law’s Customer Suit Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1605, 1610–13 (2013), but are ultimately 
superseded by complaints about the threat to economically productive manufacturing operations 
from patents of indeterminate scope. 
14. For a discussion of Knightian uncertainty—uncertainty which cannot be measured, as
distinct from risk, which can—see generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND
PROFIT (1921). 
15. See Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH.
103, 104 (2013). 
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trespass to land requires some level of intent,16 patent infringement is 
widely regarded as a strict liability offense17 and arguably warrants an 
even more robust level of notice to justify the imposition of liability. 
In sum, while Professor Mossoff advances a valid conceptual and 
empirical criticism of patent indeterminacy arguments, his proposal for 
symmetry between patents and real property would benefit from greater 
appreciation for the cognitive economy that the trespass metaphor 
offers. Without it, arguing broadly about patent estate boundaries would 
make the patent indeterminacy debate still more incoherent. Specifying 
what doctrines of patent law are truly analogous to trespass would make 
the trespass metaphor a more meaningful policy heuristic, and lend 
greater discipline to the rhetoric of patent failure. 
16. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (explaining that unauthorized entry with
intent creates liability even if the possessor of the land suffers no harm); id. § 166 (explaining 
that an entry that is unintentional and non-negligent does not create liability even if the 
possessor suffers a resulting harm). 
17. E.g., In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (2007).
